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THE TRIAL OF PETTY OFFENSES BY FEDERAL MAGISTRATES:
COLLISION WITH AMENDMENT VI
The author discusses the trial of petty offenses by federal
magistrates under the newly promulgated Rules of Procedure
for the Trial of Minor Offenses in light of the sixth amendment
guaranteesof trialby jury and right to counsel.

I. THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Our Federal Constitution, by the sixth amendment, provides for trial
by jury and the right to counsel for an accused in a criminal proceeding.
It states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ...and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend.
VI (footnote omitted).
However, the newly promulgated Rules of Procedure for the Trial of
Minor Offenses before United States Magistrates seem to make two
significant exceptions to the much revered Amendment.1 Specifically,
Rules 2 and 3 appear to safeguard the rights of trial by jury and
assignment of counsel for "minor offenses," but not for "petty
offenses." The statutory definition of a "petty offense" is deceivingly
simple. It reads:
Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more
than $500, or both, is a petty offense. 2
Notwithstanding the seeming statutory precision of the "petty
offense" definition, the courts do not appear to have provided any clear
guidelines. They have technically separated "petty offenses" from that
category by looking at the seriousness of the offense (or the obvious
depravity test),' on other occasions to the length of the maximum
possible sentence; 4 yet at other times a majority of the courts have
ignored the maximum possible sentence and adopted the sentence
actually imposed as its guideline. 5
1 18 U.S.C. §3402 (1971), amending 18 U.S.C. §3402 (1968). See also 18 U.S.C.
§3006A(b) (1964).
2 18 U.S.C. §1 (3) (1964).
3 District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
4 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
5 Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
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In District of Columbia v. Colts, 6 the court concluded that the
defendant was entitled to all constitutional safeguards notwithstanding
the fact that the relevant statute provided for punishment for "driving
recklessly" by not more than a $100 fine or 30 days imprisonment.
There they concluded that the offense was malum in se and one of
"obvious depravity." 7
In Powell v. Alabama,8 Justice Sutherland spoke for the Supreme
Court of Alabama in illustrating the importance of the assistance of
counsel:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 9
Once again in Jobnson v. Zerbst,1 0 the Court stated the reasoning
for the accused's right to counsel:
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel
is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own
ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights...
Although both of the preceding cases involved the commission of
"serious" crimes, the Court's pronouncements are not limiting, but
rather inclusive and absolute. But it was not until Evans v. Rives, 2 that
a Federal Court stepped beyond the comfortable boundaries of the
merits of a case and faced the problem of a defendant's rights in a
"non-serious" misdemeanor case. The District Attorney suggested that
the constitutional guaranty of the right to the assistance of counsel in
criminal prosecutions applied only in "serious offenses." The court
replied:
No such differentiation is made in the wording of the guaranty
itself, and we are cited to no authority, and know of none,
making this distinction. The purpose of the guaranty is to give
assurance against deprivation of life or liberty except strictly
according to law. The petitioner would be as effectively
deprived of his liberty by a sentence to a year in jail for the
crime of non-support of a minor child as by a sentence of a year
in jail for any other crime, however serious. And so far as the
6 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
7Id. at 7 3.
8 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9 Id. at 69.
10 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11 Id. at 465.
12 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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right to the assistance of counsel is concerned, the Constitution
draws no distinction between
loss of liberty for a short period
13
and such loss for a long one.
The Evans case has been severely critized because of the possibility
that it "could create substantial practical problems, e.g ..... 'the
burden placed on members of the bar who are not paid for their
services and the additional time spent in jail by defendants awaiting
trial."I 4 These criticisms seem somewhat lame and baseless in view of
recently formed Public Defenders Systems and Bail Reform Acts,
especially in light of "petty offenses."
Controversy over the Evans decision seemed all but moot until the
Fifth Circuit Court decided Harvey v. State of Mississippi.1 s In Harvey,
the court struck down a guilty plea to possession of whiskey, which was
a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of 90 days imprisonment,
because the defendant had not been advised of his right to counsel. The
court, however, held that a defendant's right to counsel extended to
"petty" or "summary" offenses as well as those considered serious. Not
only did Harvey go beyond Evans, but beyond the Criminal Justice Act
of 19641 6 as well.
Following closely on the heels of Harvey came McDonald v.
Moore, 17 which reaffirmed its predecessor on very similar facts.1 8 It
seemed as if the courts would extend the somewhat liberalized doctrine
of counsel first formed in Evans until the decision in Brinson v.
Florida"9 was rendered by the U. S. District Court. In Brinson, the
court attempted to retreat from deciding the "petty offense" right to
counsel question by distinguishing Harvey and McDonald on the basis
of the "flagrant circumstances ' 2 0 involved in those cases. The court
also strove to nullify the impact of Evans by cutting away at its
authority in strictly state matters. But the major reason for the court's
hesitancy seems to have been the fear that an extension of Gideon v.
Wainwrigbt2 1 would crumble the already shaky archaic administrative
foundations.
If Gideon is extended to all misdemeanors, its effect would be
profound and create a tremendous economic and administrative
urden... The demands upon the bench and bar would be
staggering and well-nigh impossible. Such a construction could
13
14
Is
16

Id. at 638.

Rahl, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CAL. L. REV. 501, 505 (1960).
340 F. 2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
18 U.S.C. §3006A (1964).
17 353 F. 2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
18 In McDonald, defendant was sentenced to six months and $350 on a misdemeanor
charge, i.e., illegal sale and possession of whiskey.
19 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
20 Id. at 845.
21 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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lead to the appointment of counsel for misdemeanors not
normally considered criminal, such as overparking and other
petty traffic offenses, jaywalking, dropping
a upon the
sidewalk, and like offenses. Further, to hold that the right to
court-appointed counsel exists in all misdemeanor cases would
in effect also be to hold that the portion of the Criminal Justice
Act relating to petty offenses is unconstitutional, since surely
the federal courts must be held to the same standards they
impose upon 2the
2 state courts under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Nevertheless, the court decided that where misdemeanor charges
involved a "serious penalty," that an accused was entitled to the
assistance of counsel.
The question now becomes settled. How far do you go in assuring an
accused of the right of counsel? By the period of incarceration, by the
amount of the fine involved, how far is too far? In other words, where
do you draw the line?
Notwithstanding the increased attacks on the doctrine of "serious
consequences" entitling a criminal defendant to counsel involving
charges that could be characterized in the "petty" category, the Fifth
23
Circuit assured the viability of Harvey in deciding James v. Headley.
In citing Harvey, the court states:
One accused of crime has the right to the assistance of counsel
before entering a plea because of the disadvantageous position
of an unassisted layman in a court of law and because of the
serious consequences which may attend a guilty plea. Such
disadvantages and consequences may weigh 2 as
heavily on an
4
accused misdemeanant as on an accused felon.
The right to counsel surely cannot be treated as some type of
abstract theorem. Does the mere fact that a defendant faces a possible
jail sentence of two, three, or four months make this any less a hardship
if he stands to sacrifice income, employment, and reputation in the
community than if he were facing a possible sentence of two, three, or
four years?
What then is the purpose of this revered right to the assistance of
counsel? It is "a means for achieving the most perfect justice possible in
a given situation. The essence of the right is to protect those charged
25
with crimes from wrongful conviction."
Can it be true that a layman, untrained in any aspect of substantative
or procedural law, is as capable of defending himself as would be
22 273 F. Supp. 840, 845; cf Bohr v. Purdy 412 F. 2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969), Wooley v.
Jacksonville 433 F. 2d 980 (5th Cir. 1970).
23 410 F. 2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
24 Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
2S 273 F. Supp. 840, 845.

1971]
Trial of Petty Offenses
learned counsel-as long as the possible sentence would be "not more
than six months incarceration or $500 or both."? 2 6
If a line need be drawn, then it must fall at the possibility of the
deprivation of a defendant's liberty. In this modern and complex
society, depriving a man of one month's freedom can be as devastating
as one year. It seems clear that the primary standard should be that
imprisonment, for however short a period, ought never to be available
as a punitive sanction unless the defendant has the "guiding hand of
counsel."

27

The deprivation of a man's liberty without the assistance of counsel
was and is a paramount ideal of the Constitution. 28 And it makes little
difference, especially to one incarcerated, whether the internment is for
a short, intermediate or longer term, for the deprivation of one's liberty
is just that:
It would be a gross perversion of solid constitutional doctrine to
find a rational distinction between one year in jail (a misdemeanor) and one year and a day in prison (a felony). Evans v.
Rives ...The Fifth Circuit has unhesitatingly refused to draw
the line even at prosecutions resulting in six months and ninety
day internments. "
It should logically follow that a differentiation between six months
(petty offense) 3 0 and six months and a day (minor offense) 3 1 would
indeed result in a "gross perversion of solid constitutional doctrine" if
this means that the mere matter of days in a sentence deprives a
criminal defendant of the right to counsel.
As this right was explained in Glasser v. United States,3 2 the Court
spoke of the primary importance of the sixth amendment:
[T] he right granted by the Sixth Amendment to an accused in a
criminal proceeding in a federal court 'to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense'. . ."is one of the safeguards deemed
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty,' and a federal court cannot constitutionally deprive an
accused,3 whose
life or liberty is at stake, of the assistance of
3
counsel.
The Supreme Court has never clearly delineated in which misdemeanors counsel is constitutionally required. 3 4 The Rules Governing
26 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964).
27 Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel & Due Process
Values, 61 U. MICH. L. REV. 219, 271 (1962).
28 See 287 U.S. 45.
29 Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397, 401 (D. Conn. 1966).
30 See 18 U.S.C. §3401 et. seq.
31 Id.
32 315 U.S. 60 (1942).

33 Id. at 69-70.
34 Bennet v. Hurley, 315 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. N.C. 1970).

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. I

The Trial Of Minor Offenses Before United States Magistrates-more
specifically the rules which prescribe that the guarantee of counsel need
not be enforced for "petty offenses" 3 s-stand in direct contradiction
to the paramount sixth amendment guarantees. The "petty offense"
standard, on its face, impairs the sixth amendment rights and should,
therefore, be found unconstitutional, and no pleas of "public convenience" or "administrative burden" should be entertained. The Constitution and its amendments are the "Supreme Law of the Land ' 3 6 and no
attempt to unconstitutionally dilute sixth amendment guarantees
should be tolerated.
II. TRIAL BY JURY
Article III § 2 of the Constitution provides that the trial of all crimes
shall be by jury, 3 7 and the sixth amendment provides for a jury trial in
all criminal prosecutions. The Courts' interpretation of these two
safeguards, however, goes far beyond the seemingly plain meaning of
the words themselves.
The Supreme Court first came to grips with the "problem" of jury
trial in petty criminal cases in Callan v. Wilson. 3 8 The defendant was
tried and convicted, before a magistrate without a jury, for "conspiracy" and was sentenced to pay a fine of $25 or to be imprisoned for
thirty days. The Court found this procedure unconstitutional in that
"conspiracy" was not within the petty offense category, 3 9 therefore,
the defendant was entitled to trial by jury. Furthermore, the Court
stated that a trial for "conspiracy" was therefore within article III and
the sixth amendment of the Constitution and that the protections
provided by these clauses were violated by a procedure which denied a
defendant a jury trial until appeal after conviction:
Without further reference to the authorities, and conceding,
that there is a class of petty or minor offenses, not usually
embraced in public criminal statutes, and not of the class or
grade triable at common law by a jury... We are of opinion
that the offense with which the appellant is charged does not
belong to that class. A conspiracy such as is charged against him
and his codefendants is by no means a petty or trivial offense.
... It is an offense of a grave character, affecting the public
at large, and we are unable to hold that a person charged with
having committed it in this District is not entitled to a jury,
when put upon trial.4 0
3s
36
37
38
39
40

See 18 U.S.C. §3006A (1964).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
U.S. CONST. art. III §2.
127 U.S. 540 (1888).
Relying on common law practice prior to the Constitution.

127 U.S. at 555-556.
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"An offense of grave character" seems to be formulated as the first of
many varied tests by which petty offenses are distinguished from those
of a more serious nature. It seems clear from Callan that one cannot
"assume that the punishment will bear proper relation to the
seriousness of the offense."4 1
The next opportunity the Court had to consider the jury requirements in petty offenses was in Scbick v. United States.4 2 Scbick dealt
with a violation of a provision of the Oleomargarine Act which
subjected the defendant to a fine of $50 for each offense. The Court
proceeded to "deal summarily" with the question of summary
43
proceedings and petty offenses. They held that the specific offense
was a petty offense on its face, that petty offenses were not "crimes"
within article III, and that the defendant's rights under the sixth
amendment could be waived as to petty offenses. One might wonder
about the Court's decision had the defendant been charged with
"conspiracy" to sell unmarked oleomargarine and not with the act
itself. The Court did indicate, however, that "the nature of the offense
and the amount of punishment prescribed rather than its place in the
statutes determine whether it is to be classed among serious or petty
offenses, whether among crimes or misdemeanors."14 4 The question still
remains. Which takes precedence-the "nature of the offense" or the
"punishment prescribed"?
A third distinction in the petty offense-jury trial question arose in
Katz v. Eldredge4 5 where Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority,
in a case involving the constitutionality of state petty offense
exceptions to jury trial, stated that:
... I think the real underlying historically established test
depends upon the character of the offense involved rather than
upon the penalty imposed .... assuming that the punishment
will bear proper relation to the seriousness of the offense, the
theory, as I understand it, which gave rise to the distinction at
common law and in subsequent statutes, is that the convenience
and benefit to the public resulting from a prompt and
inexpensive trial and punishment of violations of petty and
trivial police power regulations are more important than the
comparatively small prejudice to the individual resulting from
his being deprived of the safeguard of indictment before having
to answer and of trial by a jury when held to answer. This, of
course, is the converse of the rule with regard to serious
offenses, crimes, and misdemeanors, where, for the preservation
of the liberties of the people, the security afforded the
41
42
43
44
45

127 U.S. at 556.
195 U.S. 65 (1904).
Receiving for sale oleomargarine which had not been branded or stamped.
195 U.S. at 68.
97 N.J.L. 123, 117 A. 841 (1922).
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individual by his right to trial by jury is more important than
the mere convenience of the public arising from a speeding and
inexpensive summary trial.4 6
This pronouncement was considered by one of the most respected
legal scholars as a "principle of persisting vitality."' 4 7 It seems blatantly
demonic, especially in light of the reasoning behind our constitutional
safeguards, that convenience to the public could ever be used to justify
the "comparatively small prejudice to the individual resulting from his
being deprived of the safeguard of... a jury when held to answer" to
criminal charges. To what degree must a criminal defendant be
"prejudiced" before he is entitled to a jury trial?
In District of Columbia v. Colts,4 8 the Court once again turned to a
dual, historical treatment-moral quality test similar to that used in
Callan,4 9 finding that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial,
notwithstanding a maximum penalty of thirty days or $100. The Court
reasoned that the offense committed, reckless driving, was one "of such
obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to
shock the general moral sense. "5
Therefore, it might be said that an "obvious depravity" valued at
thirty days or $100- 1 may be equated with a "grave offense" valued at
thirty days or $25, s 2 so far as being taken out of the realm of "petty"
offenses is concerned. But, how then would an "offense" valued at
ninety days or $30 be classified? This became the next problem for the
Court in its clarification of the spectrum of petty offenses.
In District of Columbia v. Clawans,53 the Court had before it a
defendant who was tried, without a jury, for the offense of selling
second-hand property without a license. He received a sentence of sixty
days from a possible maximum sentence of ninety days or $300 fine.
The Court understandably found itself in a rather tenuous position
when it held that the penalty authorized for certain crimes was of major
relevance in determining whether it was a "serious" or "petty" offense,
and could be by itself serious enough to require trial by jury. The
penalty authorized in the specific locality was utilized "as a gauge of its
social and ethical judgement." 5 4 Therefore, the maximum penalty
authorized, ninety days or $300, was held to be exempted from the
class for which the Constitution assured trial by jury.
46 97 N.J.L. at 151, 117 A. at 852.

47 Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial
by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926).
48 282 U.S. 63.
49 127 U.S. 540.
so 282 U.S. at 73.
51

282 U.S. 63.

52 127 U.S. 540.
53 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
54 Id. at 628.

Trial of Petty Offenses
19711
It should be remembered that these three previously mentioned
decisions and their reasoning form the basis of today's "petty offense"
exceptions to sixth amendment rights, and at best, they seem to be
totally contradictory.
In Cbeff v. Scbnackenberg,s s the Court, interpreting a criminal
contempt statute5 6 under which the defendant was tried, held that
"crimes" carrying possible penalties up to six months did not require a
jury trial if they otherwise qualified as petty offenses. But the
contempt statute treated the extent of punishment as a matter to be
determined by the Court. In other words, there was more than a strong
possibility that the "maximum penalty authorized" would far exceed
the most liberal interpretations of the petty offense exceptions.
Without overruling prior decisions in this area and in the face of a need
for a concrete pronouncement to clarify the existing ambiguity
involved, the Court adroitly sidestepped both issues and decided that
the penalty "actually imposed" was the best evidence of the seriousness
57
of the offense.
The Court readily admitted in Duncan v. Louisiana,s" that the
"boundaries of the petty offense category have always been ill-defined,
if not ambulatory." s 9 But this factor did not deter them from deciding
60
the question using a much criticized mechanical approach:
In determining whether the length of the authorized prison
term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself
to require a jury trial, we are counseled by District of Columbia
v. Clawans, supra, to refer to objective criteria, chiefly the
existing laws and practices in the Nation. In the federal system,
petty offenses are defined as those punishable
by no more than
61
six months in prison and a $500 fine.
But to refer to "existing laws and practices in the Nation" when
those laws are admitted to be "ill-defined" ' 62 is to engage in a circular
argument with predictable consequences.
However, in the recent case of Baldwin v. New York, 6 3 the Court
appears to have come closer to the dreaded task of "drawing the line."
In this case we decide only that a potential sentence in excess of
six months' imprisonment is sufficiently severe by itself to take
the offense out of the category of "petty."64
55 384 U.S. 373.
56 18 U.S.C. §401 (1964).
57 C. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63
(1930); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
s8 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
59 Id. at 160.
60 See note 35 supra.
61 391 U.S. at 161.
62
Id. at 160.
63 399 U.S. 66.
64 282 U.S. 69. In Baldwin, the defendant was sentenced to one year in jail, without trial
by jury.
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It seems that if other factors would be included in the Court's
formula, offenses punishable by a maximum of six months may also be
taken out of the petty category. The problem of classification was
discussed openly and frankly in the light of contemporary standards
and not on a pure historical basis:
One who is threatened with the possibility of imprisonment for
six months may find little difference between the potential
consequences that face him, and the consequence that faced
appellant here. Indeed, the prospect of imprisonment for
however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a
trivial or "pett)" matter and may well result in quite serious
repercussions affecting his career and his reputation. I
The question must again be put forward. Were article III and the
sixth amendment created to enhance and expand the historical standard
of public convenience or were they the written desires of those who
saw the importance of safeguarding man's most expensive and valuable
possession-liberty?
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined concurring
in the judgment in Baldwin, stated that, "The Constitution guarantees a
right of trial by jury in two separate places but in neither does it hint of
any difference between 'petty' offenses and 'serious' offenses ....Thus

the Constitution itself guarantees a jury trial '[i] n all criminal
prosecutions' and 'in all crimes.' "66
The sole conclusion is that the Constitution requires jury trial of all
crimes, including petty offenses. "That is what the drafters said, and
what they said we are bound to heed; whether or not they actually
61
realized and intended all the implications is immaterial."
III. OPINION
This author has no desire to bring the present troubled administration of criminal justice to a grinding halt. If all criminal defendants
were guilty of the crime charged with, summary procedure would not
only be desired but well accepted. However, a line must be drawn, and
its demarcation must be figured with more than mere "public
convenience" in mind.
The justification of present summary trial practices based on
historical precedent should be closely scrutinized. The "petty" criminal
defendant of today stands in a far more precarious position, socially
and economically, than did his "historical" counterpart. The complexities and swift events of today's world do not stand stationary while one
serves a prison sentence.
65 Id. at 73.

66 Id. at 74-75.
67 Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers! 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959).
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Thus, if the possibility exists that a "petty" criminal defendant will
be incarcerated for any period of time whatsoever, he should be
allowed his inherent right to be tried by a jury of his peers and to have
the assistance of counsel.
After a thorough search of the Constitution, this author has been
unable to find the slightest inclusion, in either article III or the sixth
amendment, of the phrase-"except in petty offenses." Therefore, even
if the meaning of the words "petty offense" could be discerned from
prior decisions of the Court, it should never be suggested that the
68
procedural rules and regulations affecting the trial of petty offenses
could ever be consistent with the plain meaning of the sixth
amendment.
D.H.

68

Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. §3401 (1971).

